Tactics and Formations

donttreadonred wrote:what we’re trying to achieve: the Ajax team of 1995. If we look below...



…. We can see that Ajax played positionally much the same way as we did against Sunderland, with the main difference being the more dedicated central positioning of Blind at the back and Rijkaard being the general. Similarly, the outside central mids were actual central midfielders, but as someone pointed out earlier, it seemed at times that Johnson and Wisdom came into the middle of the field as part of the initial pressure phase. We definitely played more compact in the first pressure phase, both in open play and in defence of free-kicks (a trait which almost let Sunderland in to score). This shape-change helped us to win the ball back as it put players in areas that Sunderland didn’t expect. It threw their shape off and had Sunderland chasing shadows. In much the same way, Ajax would keep the ball moving and drop Litmanen into central positions to make their diamond midifield into a flat midfield, causing the opposition to reassess their own shape as they now had a new arrangement to face. The constant moving of the ball under Van Gaal was something that relied on good balance, good width, coverage of both the thirds of the field and the channels, and Van Gaal felt that a 3-4-3 did that job better than other formations, even Ajax’s historically prized 4-3-3. But it was also flexible, as have seen, and could even be changed to a 4-3-3 by dropping Rijkaard into the defense and having Blind play as a sweeper. If anyone wants to see the potential for how Rodgers wants us to play, don’t watch Barcelona – watch Ajax in the 1995 Champions League and the Eredivisie. That was the archetype of “Death by Passing”.

stevieg8 wrote:PeerIess, you're killing me man. Please reread what was posted.

The article in no way compares our team or squad to that great side. Instead, it points out tactical similarities that show us what our longterm goal is. Nobody thinks Downing and Andre Wisdom are going to win us the league or the CL, and nobody thinks that beating Sunderland is equivalent to winning a trophy. You're looking for stupidity that isn't there just to have something to criticize.

The point of this article is to take close analysis and use it for optimism. It is praising BR for his tactics and his approach to coaching by giving us a parallel to look at, and something that we can achieve in the near future with the right additions over the next couple years. You really seemed to miss the point.

peerless wrote:Does anyone else think that a narrower 433 with Luis Suarez in the hole would work?



Not really accurate place-wise but I think it could be an innovative formation that could have success. Glen Johnson is already known for his attacking runs, and he is one of Liverpool Football Club's best players, so giving him the license to attack him the pitch freely and come back freely would be interesting.

Jose Enrique could do that, but of course not to the same efficiency as Glen Johnson.

Martin Skrtel = stopper
Daniel Agger = sweeper

Lucas Leiva as a defensive midfielder, Steven Gerrard whatever he wants, Joseph Allen as a link man.

Luis Suarez in the hole, being able to create chances for Fabio Borini and Daniel Sturridge whilst still being able to score. Luis Suarez is definitely apt for a trequartista-esque role, but would Brendan Rodgers variate?

Why Daniel Sturridge Solves Liverpool’s Tactical Problems

The introduction of Daniel Sturridge has brought about tactical changes at Anfield that possibly offer a resounding solution to Liverpool’s defining tactical inefficiency that we have seen so much of this season. For the last two seasons (and more) at Anfield, Liverpool have consistently created chance after chance, only to leave fans frustrated and little to offer on the score sheet. Most people will tell you that the reason behind this was the inability of Liverpool’s players to finish and in some circumstances this may be true. However, there was always a much larger underlying tactical issue at the nucleus of the problem.

Liverpool are a team that now play with a slower build-up approach than most teams in the English Premier League and they are also a team that many teams employ a low-block against. These two factors make it difficult for Liverpool to counter-attack, since the opposition is already organised defensively. Here’s the problem – Liverpool have also been a team that have heavily relied on crossing over the last few years (see link at end of article) and have even signed players with this function as an objective in mind (Carroll, Downing…). Crossing is most effective when you have achieved a situation whereby you have a relatively high ratio of your players to opposition players inside the 18-yard box and the most likely occurrence of such a scenario is on the counter attack: to get in behind the opposition’s midfield and break. Of course crossing from the by-line still offers the opportunity for player movement to run onto the ball, but crossing from deep should be kept to a minimum without question when the opposition is well prepared and sitting deep.

In theory, a counter-attack can be coupled with crossing with high effect. Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur are two teams who excel with this method. Manchester United have also got players who can pick spaces within a compact organised defence too – which is why they are so successful (the combination of the two). A slow build-up team like Liverpool or (for theoretical perfection) Barcelona, will dictate play and attempt to find assists from within and around zone 14 (Zone 14 is simply the area in front of the opposition’s 18-yard box). The following two images are diagrams that illustrate the theory of build-up play and its relationship with attacking attitudes.




Liverpool have in many ways tried to ditch their crossing habit this season, however they have been victims of a lack of patience and/or players in advanced areas to succeed as a slow build-up team. The team would try to play centrally, but through impatience the full-backs and inside forwards would drift into wider areas and then attempt to cross into an opposition packed box. As a result of the drifting of these players, Liverpool’s attacks were often isolated and ineffective. Since Rodgers’ method seeks to control games, the execution of his methods have failed to achieve control despite winning the possession statistic. Instead, the opposition have controlled games despite not having the ball – the opposition force Liverpool wide and are happy to let Liverpool distribute possession slowly as this is when the opposition will rest (and save energy to hit back with the counter attack). Teams play against Liverpool knowing that if they can protect central areas in their own third and hit Liverpool on the counter attack that they stand a chance of winning.



The game against Aston Villa in December was a game where Liverpool created 29 attempts at goal and in combination attempted 37 open play crosses. I don’t need to remind you about the Aston Villa performance. The game against Norwich (January 2013), was game that still had it’s moments of impatience (often from full-backs) but consisted of only 13 open play crosses – many of which were from within the 18-yard box, on the counter-attack or from the by-line.

Liverpool’s issue has been that of struggling to find a formation (particularly in attack) that allows players to concentrate play (with options) in and around zone 14. Barcelona’s (and theoretically perfect) 3-4-3 formation [shown below] works well because of player personnel and attitudes towards patience, full backs and dribbling. In the Barcelona build-up the fullbacks and dribbling are used as ways to stretch the game and Barcelona tease the opposition out of position using either of these methods. It is clear that Liverpool for the first three months of the season used full-backs and the dribble as a way of trying to create goal scoring opportunities and relied on these two functions far more so than Barcelona do. Therefore Rodgers has had to find a positional solution that offers Liverpool freedom from crossing and freedom to concentrate play centrally with options (to avoid impatience).


Luis Suarez was originally employed in Leo Messi’s role (see Barcelona’s formation) of a false 9 to get Suarez on the ball as often as possible, however the problem is that this role is only effective (for the team’s play) if all things are in place. With the introduction of Sturridge, Rodgers has jumped at the opportunity to try something different tactically. Suarez now finds himself positioned in the number 10 role [see relevant images below] and Sturridge plays a much more advanced number 9 role, still allowing Suarez with the opportunity to pick up the ball and break forward, but now there are players in advanced positions to offer combination play in central and dangerous areas of the field. Therefore, it is easy to see how this new tactical solution offers Liverpool with options and takes them away from crossing as an attempted method of assist. Now, Rodgers will hope teams come to play against Liverpool and struggle to defend with ease in central areas.

So by signing Sturridge, Liverpool have bought so much more than a Premier League striker who has potential to succeed at the highest level, they’ve bought a new tactical solution; a solution that is Liverpool FC specific and isn’t an attempt to mimic what works for another club elsewhere. Each set of players will have their own unique player profile and it is the job of the manager to find the structure that fits into his philosophy.

The implementation process for Rodgers at Liverpool wasn’t just about finding players or educating players to play his way, it was about Rodgers developing as a manager himself and finding new positional systems that succeed at creating goal-scoring opportunities through having the ball, excel in the transitions and are difficult to break down in the defensive organisation.

No quote sums Rodgers’ approach up better than the words of the man himself:

“My template for everything is organisation. With the ball you have to know the movement patterns, the rotation, the fluidity and positioning of the team. Then there’s our defensive organisation…so if it is not going well we have a default mechanism which makes us hard to beat and we can pass our way into the game again. Rest with the ball. Then we’ll build again.”

(Rodgers, January 2012)

Where reporters get the formation line-up wrong is by suggesting that Liverpool play 4-3-3. Liverpool don’t play 4-3-3 like Barcelona do at times (without the ball, turning into a 3-4-3 with the ball). Instead, Liverpool play 4-4-1-1 in a deep block, they play 4-2-3-1 in the high block and they play a variation of 3-4-3 in the attacking phase of ball circulation. The diagrams that illustrate this are attached below and are drawn up on the basis of the original tactic employed at Anfield against Norwich (January 2013) [note - numbers are to represent positions only].
LFC 343attack Why Daniel Sturridge Solves Liverpools Tactical Problems

In attack


When the opposition have the ball in their own half


When the opposition have the ball in the Liverpool half


N.B. All pitch images are created by Jed Davies and are not taken from any website.

LINKS

Liverpool’s reliance of crossing in statistics: http://www.eplindex.com/16597/a-cross-to-bear-liverpools-crossing-addiction-in-2011-12.html

Proof that Zone 14 is the most likely zone on the field that assists occur: http://tikitakafootballcoaching.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/goals-analysis/

All other stats are taken from EPLIndex’s Stats Centre

HEIL MEIN REDS wrote: I have recently started taking interest in tactics and all that; so this thread is awesome If anyone is interested in more about tactics and formations, this is a good blog:
http://jeddavies.com/published-articles/
I have found this one while reading www.eplindex.com only.
Although the old graphics was better, it is still interesting to read and understand what BR is trying to achieve at LFC.

Messiah "Aggerswagger" wrote:

ynwa wrote:Technically, I've said Glen Johnson's been our best defender this season.

But at the moment, he's been way too fatigue and teams are exploiting that. So the whole defence has been in shambles, especially in the last month or two... the attackers have definitely been carrying us since January. Also, I have nothing against Agger. He's one of my favourite players. lol. But are you honestly telling me he's been anywhere near the quality we expect him from this season? You're kidding yourself if you do.

Carragher has been good, if not better, and Skrtel is basically out of the side because Danny's better with the ball in his feet. You can't argue Agger is a better defender than Skrtel because Martin's on the bench. It doesn't work like that. And Skrtel isn't my favourite player. It's just I don't understand why people have an agenda against him when players around him are doing the same mistakes but the only excuse to defend them is "they're adapting to the system". The same point that apparently doesn't apply to Skrtel. So if we could have some equality, and not all point and blame Skrtel for this season because he's the next scapegoat, we'll all be a bunch of happier people.

Also, a defence coach is key. Rodgers and Pascoe are deinitely working on the attacking/passing point of our game, but they have no real understanding of how to set up a defence properly. If they did, they would of worked on that first. Every manager works from defence to attack - not the other way around.

I told you I don't want to debate about our best defender or worst defender, especially in this thread. It would lead to nowhere as we're both clearly going to stand to our points but If you'd like we can do it in the Pool section.

Not Rodgers (and you should know this). When he signed he specified that he will be improving us on getting goals first and foremost and go from there.

iftikhar wrote:-----------Mignolet----------
Glen-Skrtel-Agger-Enrique
-------Lucas--Gerrard-------
Suarez---Coutinho---Aspas
-----------Sturridge----------

If there  is no further changes (in or out) in the squad, do you think this is the best line-up! Also, how do you think it will perform given the potential back-ups: Reina, Kelly, Wisdom, Toure, Coates, Spearing, Allen, Henderson, Downing, Alberto, Rahim & Borini.