The 1960 European Cup final is often regarded as something close to year zero for many in football. Real Madrid beat Eintracht Frankfurt 7-3 at Hampden Park in one of the most infamously brutal and brilliant exhibitions of football most had ever seen. It wasn't just a magnificent performance, but an inspiration to a generation.

“They were unbelievable,” said Sir Alex Ferguson, in the crowd after watching the Germans wipe the floor with his own Rangers in the semi-final. “They were the first really international club side and they were fantastic."

You'll know the names in that Real side. The great defender Jose Santamaria. The flying winger Franciso Gento. The galloping Ferenc Puskas, who scored four of the seven goals. And, of course, Alfredo di Stefano, who 'chipped-in' with the other three.

Di Stefano is a Madrid institution. He played for Real a little under 400 times over 11 years, scoring a remarkable 307 goals. He managed the club for a couple of years. He's now the honorary club president, the physical embodiment of the club's history and a reminder of the standard expected of new signings, as they parade around the Santiago Bernabeu waving to the crowd and juggling like grinning, doped-up seals.

And yet, if it hadn't been for the chutzpah of a chief scout, none of this would have happened.

In 1952 Di Stefano was playing for Colombian side Millonarios, having moved their from his first club River Plate. Millonarios toured Spain that year and played Real, but while the hosts were suitably impressed with their guests' star forward, it was Pepe Samiter, a former Barcelona hero and the club's de facto chief scout, that really took an interest.

Over the following year, Barca conducted painstaking negotiations in an attempt to bring Di Stefano to Spain, negotiations that were complicated by his interesting contract situation. For while Di Stefano was to all intents and purposes a Millonarios player, River still had some rights over him. The Colombians controlled him up until 1954, while from 1955 the Argentineans had dibs, therefore requiring the permission of both clubs to sign him for any length of time. After months of complex and logistically tricky talks, conducted through a Catalan lawyer named Ramon Trias Fargas, Barca believed they had an agreement with River for Di Stefano's transfer, and announced as such.

Of course, as with any situation where ownership is this complicated, it wasn't quite that simple. While Barca thought they had their man, River and Millonarios maintained that the deal required the permission of the Colombian club, which had not yet been given. In an attempt to push the move through, Barca brought in Samiter and a Colombian friend of his named Juan Busquets. A smart move, one might think. Not so, when you consider that Busquets was actually a director of CF Santa Fe, Millonarios's main rivals in Bogota. Busquets issued a brash ultimatum that they must accept the offer on the table for Di Stefano, or as they had the consent of River, they would take him to Cataluyna anyway.

And take him they did, after Di Stefano effectively absconded from Millonarios during a tour to Venezuela, and headed to Barcelona, despite owing the Colombian side some $5,000. Di Stefano signed a contract and posed in a Barcelona shirt, and the move was even ratified by FIFA, unaware of the contractual snafu behind the deal. Millonarios, understandably miffed by such arrogance and bullying tactics, refused to release him, and reported Barcelona to the Spanish FA. More negotiations followed, with Trias Fargas often frustrated by Barca president Enric Marti Carreto's refusal to pay the price demanded by Millonarios.

It was then that the shining white spectre of Real loomed into view. Madrid had some rather powerful friends effectively backed as they were by General Franco's government, who introduced a law banning the signing of foreign players.

At the time, Barca already had a hero. László Kubala was a Hungarian defector who escaped to the west and signed for Barca in 1950. In his first season, he scored 39 goals in 28 games. The prospect of Di Stefano combining with Kubala to create a potentially dominant generation of Catalan footballing power simply would not do.

The government announced that Di Stefano, an Argentinean who had also played a couple of times for Colombia, would be exempt from the ban on foreigners, but only if he was 'shared' between Barca and Real. The plan was for him to play for the clubs in alternate years – Real in 1953/4 and 1955/6, and Barca in 1954/6 and 1957/8. Marti Carreto and Real president Santiago Bernabeu agreed to the deal.

Predictably enough, the idea of sharing Di Stefano with the Francoist Real did not go down well in a Cataluyna whose scars from the Civil War were still raw. Catalan nationalism was fiercely and often ruthlessly stamped upon by the fascist government, and this was seen as just another way the establishment were trying to keep Barca down. A week of protests followed which were so vocal and outraged that Marti Carreto was forced to resign. The board, in charge of the club during the power vacuum and possibly fearing for their own necks, perhaps sensibly opted to scrap the deal, in return for 4.4million Pesetas in compensation, and Di Stefano was a Real player.

Catalans rarely need an excuse to feel victimised by the controlling Castillian forces. When they say they are 'mes que un club', they mean that they see themselves as not just a mere football team, but representatives of a largely unrecognised and oppressed nation. From the six-month closure of their stadium in 1926 after fans booed the national anthem, to the murder of president Josep Sunyol by fascist forces during the Civil War, the Di Stefano affair was seen as just another way that Barca, and by extension Cataluyna, were being kept down. Indeed, the scars left by the Di Stefano transfer remain - even on their official website today, Barcelona describe the affair as 'a strange federative manoeuvre'.

The feeling of injustice was no doubt exacerbated by the sight of Real, with Di Stefano leading them, winning the first five European Cups, while Barcelona had to wait until 1992 to claim their first. Barca by no means went without in the meantime – with Kubala and the brilliant Luis Suarez, and latterly with Helenio Herrera as manager, they won four Liga titles in the 1950s and became the first team to beat Real in European competition in 1961, but they were potentially denied a dynasty.

On such small things does history turn, but when Di Stefano was twice named European Footballer of the Year and lifted all those European Cups, back in Cataluyna they were cursing, and wondering what might have been.

What you may have heard:

From 1929 to 1953, Real Madrid only won two of 22 leagues, both times before the war. During the eleven years since 1953, the year that Di Stéfano arrived at the club, Real Madrid won 8 leagues , 2 Latin Cups, 5 European Champion Cups and an Intercontinental Cup. Di Stéfano was signed after a race with Barcelona for the Argentinian’s services, who finally went to the Whites. In later years, the Barcelonistas claimed a supposed intervention of Franco’s government for the benefit of Real Madrid, as well as all sorts of dirty maneuvers by the capital’s club to get the player. But once again, reality is very different.

The hard, cold facts:

Alfredo Di Stéfano became known to Real Madrid fans in the club’s 50th anniversary match against Millonarios of Bogotá. Madrid’s council became immediately interested by Millonario’s number 9, but said club officials pointed the impossibility of his signing, because of the “Pact of Lima”, which put the player in a complicated contractual situation.
Some years back, Alfredo Di Stéfano had been the sensation of the 1947 Argentinian league, playing for River Plate and becoming top scorer with 27 goals. But his situation changed drastically with the strike called by the Futbolistas Argentinos Agremiados association, which prevented him from playing again until May 1949. But by then his spirits were down and his relationship with the River rulers was very poor, so in August of that year he left for Colombia.

In that year, Columbian football was in the process of splitting. The club’s rulers had left the Federación Colombiana and created the Asociación Colombiana, which began signing players and paying high sums for them. Among these players were Di Stéfano, who signed for Millonarios de Bogotá. FIFA didn’t recognize the new association’s rights, thus starting a long conflict which was solved in 1951, with the Pact of Lima. In fact, FIFA recognized the club’s rights over the players until December 31, 1954 at most. After that date, the rights would return to the previous player’s owner, River Plate in the case of Di Stéfano.
The Argentinian had emigrated searching for a a better professional future, but the situation in Colombia was changing: every time less people attended the games, and for the players it was becoming increasingly difficult to receive their salaries. During a team’s trip to Chile in Christmas 1952, Di Stéfano declares himself in rebellion. Then he travels to Buenos Aires and decides no to return to Colombia, even considering retiring from football. Millonarios sues Di Stéfano, who had perceived $4000 in advance, and FIFA tells every federation about the impossibility of signing him. As a result of these events, the player was in 1953 in Buenos Aires, unable to sign for any club and waiting until 1955 to return to River Plate.

Meanwhile, in Spain, and thanks to Kubala’s arrival, Barcelona had cemented its hegemony in Spanish football. They had won the Cup in 1951 and 1952 and the 51-52 League. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1953 Kubala was diagnosed with a lung affection which raised serious fears about the player’s future. Facing this situation, the president Enrique Martí trusted the technical secretary José Samitier with the signing of a star who could replace Kubala. Barcelona then put its eye on Di Stéfano, and started contacts with River Plate, although the rights still belonged to Millonarios. Even so, Barcelona’s president reached an agreement with River Plate by which they’d pay 4 million pesetas for the services of Di Stéfano, starting January 1, 1955.

On May 23, 1953, Di Stéfano arrives in Barcelona. But by that time Kubala’s health has fully recovered, thanks to which Barcelona wins the League and the Cup, being for this reason it was invited to the “Pequeña Copa del Mundo” held in Caracas. Barcelona’s president Martí travels there intending to solve Di Stéfano’s signing with Millonarios. In the interview, Millonarios’s president, Alfonso Seniors, demands a payment of $ 27.000 (roughly 500.000 pesetas) for the players’ rights. Barcelona’s president refuses to do so, and he even declares that they are willing to keep Di Stéfano from playing for a whole season.

Di Stefano

In that moment, Real Madrid makes its appearance. Madrid’s vice president, Álvaro Bustamante, sends Raimundo Saporta to Bogotá with the $27.000 required to sign the player. Once this is done, Saporta travels to Buenos Aires to buy the remaining rights from River Plate, but this can’t be achieved, since Barcelona had already paid 2 million pesetas to River. Nevertheless, Saporta gets a commitment from the club to not taking sides in case a conflict arises. Considering Di Stéfano a Real Madrid player in that moment, Saporta travels to Barcelona and contacts him. Those days the player felt abandoned by Barcelona, feeling unable to solve his case and having played only three friendly games with the club. His interview with Saporta gives cheers him back up, and the fact that Saporta pays him his first money as a Real Madrid’s player also cheers his wife, who was already worried about the family’s budget. One week later, Millonarios’ president meets Don Santiago Bernabéu in Madrid, closing the player’s transfer to the White club. Alfredo Di Stéfano was a Real Madrid player… till January 1, 1955.

In this situation, none of the two Spanish clubs held the rights for the 1953-54 season. FIFA told the Spanish Federation that Di Stéfano wouldn’t be granted any license till this conflict was solved. It was necessary thus for both teams to reach an agreement. Faced with this, Barcelona’s president loses his nerve and tries to sell the player’s rights to Juventus of Torino without informing Di Stéfano, which angered the player. After Juventus’ refusal to negotiate for a player with such a complicated situation, Barcelona contacts River Plate asking in quite inadequate manners for the withdrawal of the contract and the returning of the two millions already paid, to which River refuses. FIFA designates Armando Muñoz Calero, former president of the Spanish federation, and who had so strongly worked for Kubala’s signing, to act as mediator. Calero takes a Salomone decision: Di Stéfano will play for Real Madrid in the seasons 1953-54 and 1955-56, and for Barcelona during 1954-55 and 1956-57. After this, both clubs will have to decide about the player’s future.

On a first moment, the clubs agree on this decision. Nevertheless, there was a new problem: Starting August 24, 1954, a new regulation prevented spanish teams from signing foreign players. At this point comes the only government intervention in all the affair, as clubs are allowed to sign those players who were in negotiations before August 22. On September 22, 1953, Real Madrid submits Di Stéfano’s license in the castilian federation. Some hours before, Barcelona’s president resigns his post due to the mistakes made during the player’s signing.

The commission which took charge of Barcelona gave up its rights over the placer provided that Real Madrid offered an economic compensation for all the spending made during the negotiations. There could be many reasons behind this decision, such as Kubala’s recovery, coach Daucik dislike of Di Stéfano first performances with Real Madrid, or his fame as a controversial player. In any case, the commission’s official reason was that Barcelona was too important a club to share a player with another team. On October 25, 1953, before the match which would face both teams in Chamartin, Barcelona signed the document by which it officially renounced to the player, with Real Madrid agreeing to pay the Catalan club 4.400.000 pesetas. On the field, the Madrid directed by the player which Barcelona had refused beat Barcelona 5-0 with two goals by Di Stéfano. Real Madrid’s golden age in national and international football had begun.

Barcelona’s lies

- The phones used by Barcelona in their South American negotiations were not bugged by Real Madrid, as claimed in sources as the FC Barcelona’s Centenary Collection, Book 11.

- There was no intervention by the government. The authorization to sign foreign players already under negotiation was a general one, and several clubs, such as Valencia, Español and Valladolid benefitted from it.

- Contrary to what’s claimed in Barcelona’s web page, Di Stéfano was not on lease on Millonarios of Bogotá. The Colombian club held the player’s rights, and thus could sell him. Also, it’s not true that FIFA supported Barcelona – It declared that both clubs were right and had to reach an agreement. If Barcelona had paid the amount demanded by Millonarios, they’d been able to keep the player. Real Madrid’s better negotiating skills, bigger spending and will to have the player gave them the edge.

barcelona's disgraceful negotiation tactics: origins

Di Stefano: I looked into Barcelona's eyes and knew they had ill intentions.